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A note on cooperative linear quadratic control.
Jacob Engwerda∗†
February, 2007
Abstract In this note we consider the cooperative linear quadratic control problem. That is, the
problem where a number of players, all facing a (different) linear quadratic control problem, decide to
cooperate in order to optimize their performance. It is well-known, in case the performance criteria
are positive definite, how one can determine the set of Pareto efficient equilibria for these games. In
this note we generalize this result for indefinite criteria.
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1 Introduction




























> 0, i = 1, 2, and x(t) is the solution of
the linear differential equation
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + B1u1(t) + B2u2(t) + c(t), x(0) = x0. (2)
The variable c(.) ∈ L2 is some given trajectory. Notice that we make no definiteness assumptions
w.r.t. matrix Qi. The planning horizon, T , may be either finite or infinite.
The objectives of the players are possibly conflicting. That is, a set of policies u1 which is optimal
for player one, may have rather negative effects on the evolution of the state variable x from another
player’s point of view.
Before one can analyze the outcome of such a decision process, a number of points have to be
made more clear. We assume that players can communicate and can enter into binding agreements.
Furthermore it is assumed that they cooperate in order to achieve their objectives. However, no
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side-payments take place. Moreover, it is assumed that every player has all information on the state
dynamics and cost functions of his opponents and all players are able to implement their decisions.
Concerning the strategies used by the players we assume that there are no restrictions. That is,
every ui(.) may be chosen arbitrarily from a set U (which depends on the problem setting and will
be specified later) in order to have a well-posed problem.
By cooperation, in general, the cost a specific player incurs is not uniquely determined anymore.
If all players decide, e.g., to use their control variables to reduce the cost of player 1 as much as
possible, a different minimum is attained for player 1 than in case all players agree to help collectively
a different player in minimizing his cost. So, depending on how the players choose to ”divide” their
control efforts, a player incurs different ”minima”. So, in general, each player is confronted with a
whole set of possible outcomes from which somehow one outcome (which in general does not coincide
with a player’s overall lowest cost) is cooperatively selected. Now, if there are two strategies γ1
and γ2 such that every player has a lower cost if strategy γ1 is played, then it seems reasonable
to assume that all players will prefer this strategy. We say that the solution induced by strategy
γ1 dominates the solution induced by the strategy γ2. So, dominance means that the outcome is
better for all players. Proceeding in this line of thinking, it seems reasonable to consider only those
cooperative outcomes which have the property that if a different strategy than the one corresponding
with this cooperative outcome is chosen, then at least one of the players has higher costs. Or, stated
differently, to consider only solutions that are such that they can not be improved upon by all players
simultaneously. This motivates the concept of Pareto efficiency.
Definition 1.1 Let U denote the set of admissible strategies. A set of strategies γ̂ is called Pareto
efficient if the set of inequalities
Ji(γ) ≤ Ji(γ̂), i = 1, · · · , N,
where at least one of the inequalities is strict, does not allow for any solution γ ∈ U . The corre-
sponding point (J1(γ̂), · · · , JN(γ̂)) ∈ IR
N is called a Pareto solution. The set of all Pareto solutions
is called the Pareto frontier. 
A Pareto solution is therefore never dominated, and for that reason called an undominated solution.
Usually there is more than one Pareto solution, because dominance is a property which generally
does not provide a total ordering.
In case Qi ≥ 0, Rii > 0, i = 1, 2, and all other matrices in our cost functions (1) are zero there
is a simple characterization for all Pareto solutions (see e.g. [1]). In this note we will generalize this
result.
2 Problem Solution
In the subsequent analysis the following set of parameters, A, plays a crucial role.





The next two lemmas provide a characterization of Pareto efficient solutions. The first lemma shows
how Pareto efficient solutions can be identified (see also [5] and [13]). This lemma holds without using
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any convexity conditions on the J ′is nor any convexity assumptions regarding the strategy space. Its
converse, Lemma 2.2 was proved by Fan et al in [2]. This lemma states that, under some convexity
assumptions on the cost functions, all Pareto efficient strategies can be obtained by considering the
minimization problem (3). A proof of both results can be found in, e.g., [1] (see also [9]).




αi = 1. Assume γ̂ ∈ U is such that







Then γ̂ is Pareto efficient. 
Lemma 2.2 Assume that the strategy space U is convex1. Moreover, assume that the payoffs Ji are









Note, that whenever Ji are convex also
∑N
i=1 αiJi(γ) is convex for an arbitrary α ∈ A.
Next we consider some sets of control functions that are relevant in our problem setting. It can be
easily shown that each of these (nonempty2) sets is convex.
Lemma 2.3 Let U be given by either:
1) L2[0, T ] := {(u1, u2) | ui(.) are square integrable functions on [0, T ]}.
2) {u ∈ L2[0, T ] | x(0) = x(T ) = 0 in ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)}.
3) L+2,e := {(u1, u2) | ui(.) ∈ L2,loc and limT→∞ Ji(x0, u) exists in IR ∪ {−∞,∞}, ∀x0}, where L2,loc
is the set of locally square-integrable functions, i.e.,
L2,loc = {u | ∀T > 0,
∫ T
0
uT (s)u(s)ds < ∞}.
4) L+2,e,s := {(u1, u2) | (u1, u2) ∈ L
+
2,e and limt→∞ x(t) = 0 in (2)}.
Then each of these set of control functions is convex. 
Next we consider the question under which conditions the cost functions Ji in (1) are convex. To
that end we first derive some preliminary results.
Lemma 2.4 Assume U is convex. Consider the linear quadratic cost function
J(s, T, u, x0) =
∫ T
s













subject to the state dynamics
ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + c1(t), x(s) = x0, (5)
1Note that if Ui is convex also the Cartesian product U := U1 × U2 is a convex set.
2assuming for case 2) and 3) that (A, [B1 B2]) is stabilizable
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Let x0 ∈ IR
N . Then, J(0, T, u, x0) is convex as a function of u if and only if J̄(0, T, v, 0) ≥ 0 for all
v, where
J̄(s, T, v, 0) =
∫ T
s





dt with ż(t) = Az(t) + Bv(t), z(s) = 0. (6)
Proof: Let xu(t) denote the state trajectory of (5) in case the control u(.) is used. Then it is
well-known that due to the linearity of the system
xλu+(1−λ)w(t) = λxu(t) + (1 − λ)xw(t). (7)
From the definition of convexity (see (9)) it follows then that J(0, T, u, x0) is convex if and only if
∫ T
0
















































{[xTu (t) − x
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w(t) u







ẋu(t) = Axu(t) + Bu(t) + c(t), xu(0) = x0 and ẋw(t) = Axw(t) + Bw(t) + c(t), xw(0) = x0.
With z := xu − xw and v := u − w the stated result then follows immediately. 
Remark 2.5
1. Note that the second part of the equivalence does not depend on x0. In particular it follows from
this that if J is convex for one x0 then J is convex for all x0. This property can also be verified by
a direct elaboration of the convexity definition using the linearity property of the system again.



























x(t) + uT (t)Ru(t)}dt.
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Then it follows immediately from Lemma 2.4 that J is convex if and only if the controllable part of
this system is convex. That is if, with




{xT1 (t)Q1x1(t) + u
T (t)Ru(t)}dt,
J1 is convex. 
Lemma 2.6 Assume U is convex. Consider the linear quadratic cost function (4) and (5). Then, if
J(0, T, u, x0) is convex for some x0, J(s, T, u, x0) is convex for all s ≥ 0 and for all x0.
Proof: Let s > 0. Let ui(t) = v(t) + wi(t), where v(t) = 0, t ≥ s and wi(t) = 0, 0 ≤ t ≤ s. Then,
J(0, T, ui, x0) = J(0, s, v, x0) + J(s, T, wi, x(s, x0)). (8)
Since J(0, T, u, x0) is convex, by definition, for an arbitrary u and w and λ ∈ (0, 1)
J(0, T, λu + (1 − λ)w, x0) ≤ λJ(0, T, u, x0) + (1 − λ)J(0, T, w, x0). (9)
So in particular if we choose u = u1 and w = u2 as above we get, using (8),
J(0, s, v, x0) + J(s, T, λw1 + (1 − λ)w2, x(s, x0)) = J(0, T, λu1 + (1 − λ)u2, x0)
≤ λJ(0, T, u1, x0) + (1 − λ)J(0, T, u2, x0)
= λ(J(0, s, v, x0) + J(s, T, w1, x(s, x0))) + (1 − λ)(J(0, s, v, x0) + J(s, T, w2, x(s, x0)))
= J(0, s, v, x0) + λJ(s, T, w1, x(s, x0))) + (1 − λ)J(s, T, w2, x(s, x0)).
Comparing both sides of this inequality shows then that J(s, T, w, x(s, x0)) is convex. The rest of
the statement follows then directly from Remark 2.5, item 1. 
Corollary 2.7 Consider the linear quadratic cost function (4) and (5). Then, J(s, T, u, x0) is convex
for all s ≥ 0 and x0 if and only if J(0, T, u, x0) is convex for all/an x0, which holds if and only if
J̄(0, T, v, 0) ≥ 0 for all v, where J̄ is given by (6). 
Theorem 2.8 Assume either T is finite or (A, B) is stabilizable. Then J(0, T, u, x0) is convex for
all/an x0 if and only if inf J̄(0, T, v, 0) exists.
Proof:
” ⇒ ” From Corollary 2.7 it follows that if J(0, T, u, x0) is convex J̄(0, T, v, 0) ≥ 0 for all v. In case T
is finite obviously inf J̄(0, T, v, 0) ≤ J(0, T, 0, 0) whereas in case (A, B) is stabilizable, inf J̄(0,∞, v, 0)
is bounded from above too. Consequently, inf J̄(0, T, v, 0) exists.
” ⇐ ” Assume inf J̄(0, T, v, 0) = m. Then m ≥ 0. For if m < 0 there would exist a v̄ such
that J̄(0, T, v̄, 0) < 0. But from this it follows directly from the linearity of the system that
J̄(0, T, λv̄, 0) = λ2J̄(0, T, v̄, 0). From which it is clear that inf J̄(0, T, v, 0) would not exist. So
J̄(0, T, v, 0) ≥ 0 for all v. This implies, see Corollary 2.7 again, that J(0, T, u, x0) is convex for all/an
x0. .
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Next we consider the case R > 0 in M . It is well-known that then the next Riccati equations
play an important role
K̇(t) = AT K(t) + K(t)A − (K(t)B + V T )R−1(BT K(t) + V ) + Q, K(T ) = 0; (DRE)
0 = AT K + KA − (KB + V T )R−1(BT K + V ) + Q. (ARE)
Let Γ denote the set of all symmetric solutions of (ARE). From, e.g., [1] and [10] (see also [8], [4],
[12], [6] [7] and [11]) we recall the next results. Notice that these results are formulated in terms of
existence of the performance function for an arbitrary initial state. In the above cited references one
can also find conditions for the existence of inf J̄(0, T, v, 0). Since the formulation of these conditions
is more involved and is somewhat outside the main scope of this note they are not presented here.









dt with ẋ(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t), x(0) = x0. (10)
Then the following holds:
1) Let T < ∞ and U = L2[0, T ]. Then, infu J exists for all x0 if and only if (DRE) has a solution
on [0, T ]. Moreover, if this infimum exists it is in fact a minimum. This minu J(u) = x
T
0 K(0)x0
is attained uniquely by u∗(t) = −R−1(BT K(t) + V )x∗(t), where K(t) is the unique symmetric
solution of (DRE) and x∗(.) solves ẋ(t) = (A − BR−1(BT K(t) + V ))x(t), x∗(0) = x0.
2) Let T = ∞, U = L+2,e,s and (A, B) be stabilizable. Then, infu J exists for all x0 if and only
if Γ 6= ∅. Moreover, there exists a u∗ attaining this infimum if and only if (ARE) has a
stabilizing solution K+. Under this condition minu J(u) = x
T
0 K
+x0 is attained uniquely by
u∗(t) = −R−1(BT K++V )x∗(t), where x∗(.) solves ẋ(t) = (A−BR−1(BT K++V ))x(t), x∗(0) =
x0.
3) Let T = ∞, U = L+2,e and (A, B) be controllable. Then, infu J exists for all x0 if (ARE) has a
symmetric solution K ≤ 0. Moreover, if this condition is satisfied there exists a u∗ attaining
this infimum if and only if ∆ ⊂ K−. Here K− is the smallest solution of Γ and ∆ := K+−K−,
where K+ is the largest solution of Γ. In that case minu J(u) = x
T
0 Kfx0 is attained uniquely by
u∗(t) = −R−1(BT Kf +V )x
∗(t), where x∗(.) solves ẋ(t) = (A−BR−1(BT Kf +V ))x(t), x
∗(0) =
x0 and Kf = K
−PN +K
+(I−PN ). Here PN is the projector onto the subspace N along ∆
−1N⊥
with N the undetectable (w.r.t. lC− ∪ lC0) subspace of (K−, (A − BR−1(BT K− + V ))). 
Remark 2.10 If (ARE) has a solution K ≥ 0 then Kf in Theorem 2.9.3) is the smallest positive
semi-definite solution of (ARE).
If one merely assumes (A, B) to be stabilizable instead of controllable in Theorem 2.9.3) (ARE)
has in general not a smallest solution anymore. It can still be shown under the same condition as in
3) (that (ARE) has a solution K ≤ 0) that the infimum exists and equals xT0 Kfx0 for some Kf ∈ Γ.
However there does not exist a nice characterization like in 3) of Kf (see [3]). 
Next introduce B := [B1 B2]. Combining the results of Lemmas 2.1, 2.2 and Theorems 2.8, 2.9
one can derive now straightforwardly existence and computational algorithms for both the finite and
infinite horizon game problems. We will just state the result for the infinite planning horizon case
where the state converges to zero. The formulation of the other results is left to the reader.
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Corollary 2.11 Consider the cooperative game (1,2) with T = ∞, U = L+2,e,s and (A, B) stabilizable.





has a stabilizing3 solution Ki, for i = 1, 2,
respectively.
Then all Pareto efficient solutions are obtained by determining for α ∈ A
u∗(α) := arg min
u∈U
α1J1 + α2J2, subject to (2). (11)




Notice that, since by assumption both cost functions are strict convex, the minimization problem
(11) has for all α ∈ A a unique solution. From this result one obtains then the next procedure to
calculate all Pareto efficient outcomes for this game.
Theorem 2.12 (Solution Cooperative Game)
Consider the cooperative game (1,2) with T = ∞, U = L+2,e,s and (A, B) stabilizable.
For α ∈ A let


















Furthermore, let S̃ := BR̃−1BT .
Assume that (12) below has a stabilizing solution Xi for αi = 1, i = 1, 2, respectively.
AT X + XA − (XB + Ṽ )R̃−1(BT X + Ṽ T ) + Q̃ = 0. (12)
Then the set of all cooperative Pareto solutions is given by
{(J1(u
∗(α)), J2(u
∗(α))) | α ∈ A}.
Here
u∗(t) = −R̃−1(BT Xs + Ṽ








where Xs is the stabilizing solution of (12) and, with Acl := A−BR̃
−1Ṽ T−S̃Xs, the closed-loop system
is ẋ(t) = Aclx(t) − Sm(t) + c(t), x(0) = x0. In case c(.) = 0 the with these actions corresponding
cost are Ji(x0, u
∗) = xT0 M̃ix0, where M̃i is the unique solution of the Lyapunov equation








3That is, σ(A − BR−1V T − SKi) ⊂ lC−.
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Figure 1: Pareto frontier Example 2.13.
Example 2.13 To illustrate the above result consider the next simplistic environmental example.
Consider a fishery management game, where two industries pollute a lake and their income depends
on the fish-stock of the lake. Assume that both the revenues and cost depend quadratically on the
fish-stock and the produced pollution. Within this context we consider the next model:






−x2(t) + 2u21(t) + u
2




−2x2(t) + u21(t) + 2u
2
2(t)dt.
Here x describes the fish-stock and ui is the pollution produced by industry i. The fact that industry
1 gives more weight to the pollution it produces than to the quantity produced by the other industry
can be interpreted as that industry 1 is really concerned about the pollution it produces itself (and
which it is able to control in contrast to the pollution produced by the other industry). In figure 1
we plotted the with this problem corresponding Pareto frontier if both players would cooperate in
this game. 
3 Concluding Remarks
In this note we showed how for the regular indefinite linear quadratic control problem one can obtain
all Pareto efficient outcomes. Using the theory of convex analysis we were able to treat both the
finite and infinite planning horizon problems in a uniform way. For the infinite planning horizon we
considered both the fixed endpoint problem and the free endpoint problem.
Open problems that remain to be solved in this context are, e.g., the free endpoint infinite
planning horizon problem under the assumption that the system is merely stabilizable and the case
that the performance criteria of both players are not directly affected by the control efforts used
by the other player (giving rise to a special singular control problem). To solve the firstmentioned
problem a good starting point might be to find first a different characterization of the solution of
the free endpoint problem under the controllability assumption. Solving the lastmentioned problem
is a point of current research. We hope to solve this problem using a different analytic approach. A
number of necessary conditions for Pareto optima in a general dynamic framework have been derived
and current research focusses on the question whether these conditions are sufficient too for that
specific linear quadratic framework.
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